COMM 337: Another type of op-ed column, a balanced foreign policy appraisal by an overseas academic observer

In Friday's issue of The Guardian (a broadsheet newspaper in the U.K.), Brian Williams of the universities of London and Oxford offers his appraisal of U.S. foreign policy under the Obama administration. Unlike happy warriors like William Safire and Peggy Noonan, who have clear partisan loyalties, Williams assesses both the pros and cons of President Obama's approach to foreign policy.

Williams' lede notes, accurately enough, that Obama's approach to the revolution in Libya has played out very well so far:

President Obama's latest foreign intervention in Libya reflects an evolution of the American way of war and the crystallisation of the "Obama Doctrine". Gone are the "shock and awe", trillion-dollar campaigns of the Bush era – right on cue, the president has followed Thursday's news of Muammar Gaddafi's death with Friday's announcement of the final pullout of US troops from Iraq by the end of 2011. In this age of austerity and public fatigue with foreign exploits, the Obama White House has diligently combined military force, technology, intelligence assets and patience to rack up an unassailable list of "wins" for the president on foreign affairs.

He compares Obama's foreign policy to former President George W. Bush's, and adds, "The Bush Doctrine played right into Osama bin Laden's hands; the Obama Doctrine killed Bin Laden."

Compare American pundits like the New York Times for example, which headlined a Libya story "Successes Overseas Are Unlikely to Help Obama at Home." Or Ken Walsh's Washington blog U.S. News and World Report, "Success in Libya Unlikely to Aid Obama's Re-election Chances."

Perhaps because he's British and doesn't have to spend all of his waking hours analyzing next year's U.S. election, Williams sees complex issues at play in what he calls the "Obama Doctrine." Even more amazing, he discusses them:

The methods behind the Obama Doctrine are just as important as the thinking. We are witnessing an evolution in the American way of war. The broad-brush "global war on terror" of Rumsfeld and Bush is being replaced by a far more sophisticated mix of ingredients. Unmanned aerial vehicles have replaced boots on the ground. This effort concentrates on gathering intelligence on opponents and then using the American technological advantage to eliminate enemy leadership. Under President Obama, the use of drones has more than tripled. While such a policy raises moral, ethnical and legal issues, the effectiveness in decimating the al-Qaida network and Taliban leaders is hard to dispute.

I think he means it raises "ethical ... issues" (since "ethnical" isn't a word and wouldn't fit the context even if it were), and I'd have to agree.

On a more pragmatic note, Williams questions "new US approach to active intervention where the US seemingly plays a secondary role to allies," but he adds, "not being the obvious lead nation is a vote winner in the US." I'm not so sure about that - the Republican primary candidates certainly don't sound like they think it's a winner! Even in the context of Libya, Williams adds:

The euphoria over Gaddafi's fall, we should remember, may prove shortlived. How secure is the National Transitional Council's authority, and will it prove capable of making the transition to a legitimate, democratic form of government? What if, in fact, Islamic extremists emerge as a major force? Or what if, perhaps, another military junta seizes power? Will we think the mission a success if, over coming months, the country decays into civil war? Can the US and its Nato allies stay out of Libya if the security situation deteriorates? All of these questions remain to be answered. Until we see how Libya pans out, the validity of the Obama Doctrine remains questionable.

And there's always Iran to think about:

The recently revealed Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to Washington, coupled with continued intransigence on their nuclear weapons programme, and interference in Afghanistan, all mean that the president will be pressured to make a tough call in the near future. If and when he does decide to act, however, it will likely not be the brash, all-guns-blazing policy of the last decade. Such an intervention will be based on covert operations and the use of technology to deliver tightly targeted military action.

But Iran is not Libya, as the US national security team is well aware, and the pragmatism of the Obama Doctrine may very well avoid conflict in favour of strategic patience. After all, given the president's foreign policy scorecard, why give in to Republican bellicosity on Iran in the run-up to the 2012 election?